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 INTRODUCTION 
Sweeping interpretations of presidential power and government 
secrecy after 9/11 bore fruit in the area of “extraordinary rendition.”  
Under this doctrine, the President claims to possess inherent 
authority to seize individuals and transfer them to other countries for 
interrogation and torture.  In the past, Attorneys General and other 
legal commentators understood that:  (1) Presidents needed 
congressional authority for these transfers and (2) the purpose was to 
bring the person to trial.  Until recently, the Justice Department held 
that the President could not order someone extradited or rendered 
without authority granted by a treaty or statute.  That view of the law 
changed radically after 9/11.  The Bush Administration sent persons 
to other countries not to try them in open court but to interrogate 
and abuse them in secret.  In lawsuits challenging this practice, the 
Bush Administration regularly invoked the state secrets privilege.1
Part I of this Article identifies the legal principles that guide 
extradition, rendition, and kidnappings.  Not until recent years did 
the Executive Branch ever claim independent authority to transfer 
suspects to another country without the support of a treaty or a 
statute, and in the infrequent cases where administrations did assert 
such authority it was for the purpose of bringing an individual to trial 
with associated judicial safeguards.  Part II concentrates on 
extraordinary rendition, prohibitions on torture, precedents under 
the Clinton Administration, and changes after 9/11.  Part III analyzes 
the legal arguments presented by the Bush Administration to justify 
extraordinary rendition, European investigations, and explanations 
offered by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.  Part IV covers 
litigation on extraordinary rendition, including the trials of Maher 
Arar and Khaled El-Masri.  Part V concludes by examining the 
standards that distinguish the Central Intelligence Agency’s (“CIA”) 
interrogations from those conducted pursuant to the Army Field 
Manual. 
I. LEGAL PRINCIPLES 
Rendition, used as a substitute for an extradition treaty, means 
surrendering someone to another jurisdiction for trial.  The verb 
“render” is used in the sense of giving up or delivering up.  Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines “rendition” this way:  “The return of a fugitive 
from one state to the state where the fugitive is accused or convicted 
 1. See infra Part IV. 
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of a crime.”2  Rendition, therefore, applies to a judicial process:  
someone accused of a crime or someone already convicted.  It has no 
application to detainees or enemy combatants held indefinitely by 
executive officials with no plan to bring them before a federal judge 
for trial.3  Rendition often seems indistinguishable from the 
definition of extradition:  “The official surrender of an alleged 
criminal by one state or nation to another having jurisdiction over 
the crime charged; the return of a fugitive from justice, regardless of 
consent, by the authorities where the fugitive is found.”4  Over time, 
rendition became associated with kidnappings and forcible 
abductions but still for the purpose of bringing someone to trial.5
A. Requiring a Statute or Treaty 
For most of U.S. history, presidents had no independent or 
exclusive authority over extraditions and renditions.  Congressional 
action was needed.  In a letter to President George Washington in 
1791, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson discussed the legal 
principles that guided the delivery of fugitives from one country to 
another.6  First, he looked to other countries’ practices and noted 
that their renditions were done under treaties or conventions 
specifying “precisely the cases wherein such deliveries shall take 
place.”7  The United States, on the other hand, did not have similar 
treaties governing fugitives, “and no authority has been given to our 
Executives to deliver them up.”8  Congress needed to act, either by 
statute or treaty, to ensure that fugitives were not surrendered to 
“tyrannical laws.”9  The following year, in a letter to Charles Pinckney, 
Jefferson underscored the risks of giving up fugitives to a despotic 
government instead of to a free one.10  Even under relatively free 
 2. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1322 (8th ed. 2004). 
 3. See id. (describing the captured person as accused of a crime or convicted of 
a crime). 
 4. Id. at 623. 
 5. See infra Part I.C. 
 6. 22 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 266 (Charles T. Cullen ed., Princeton 
Univ. Press 1986) (1791). 
 7. See id. at 266 (looking to conventions between France and Spain, France and 
Sardinia, France and Germany, and others as examples of clearly articulated 
extradition). 
 8. See id. (commenting that England had become a hiding ground for both 
criminals and the innocent because it lacked extradition treaties and that the United 
States was similarly open to fugitives). 
 9. See id. at 267 (recommending conventions as a first step toward protecting 
against inappropriate renditions). 
 10. See 23 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 360 (Charles T. Cullen ed., Princeton 
Univ. Press 1990) (1792) (explaining that despots do not wish allow the opportunity 
for subjects to flee from the oppression of their laws). 
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governments, such as England’s, Jefferson found the punishments so 
disproportionate to the crimes that the thought of rendition or 
extradition was repugnant.11  In a paper prepared in 1792, he noted 
that in England “to steal a hare is death, the first offence.”12  In his 
view, all excess punishments were a crime.13  It followed that “to remit 
a fugitive to excessive punishment is to be accessary to the crime.”14  
Jefferson believed that in deciding to return someone to another 
country, the Legislative Branch had to decide the seriousness of the 
crime.15  Also, fugitives were entitled to judicial proceedings under 
Justices of the Supreme Court or district judges before surrender to 
their governments.16
In 1793, Jefferson responded to the request by the French Minister 
to the United States to have certain individuals handed over because 
they had committed crimes against France.17  Jefferson explained that 
the laws of the United States “take no notice of crimes committed out 
of their jurisdiction.”18  The “most atrocious offender . . . is 
received . . . as an innocent man, and [the laws] have authorized no 
one to seize or deliver him.”19  The consular convention with France 
included a provision for delivering up captains and crew members, 
but such actions required the review of the district judges of each 
state.20  Alleged criminals “cannot be given up, and if they be the crew 
of a vessel, the act of Congress has not given authority to any one 
officer to send his process through all the States of the Union.”21
Attorneys general repeatedly held that extradition and rendition 
require congressional action by statutes or treaties.  In 1797, Attorney 
General Charles Lee advised the State Department about a dispute 
that had arisen with Spain.22  The Minister of Spain reported that his 
country’s territorial rights had been violated by the actions of a 
Spanish subject who had taken refuge in Florida.23  Lee conceded 
 11. See 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:   FOREIGN RELATIONS 258 (Washington D.C., 
Gales and Seaton 1833) (warning that crimes against property were particularly 
susceptible to disproportionate punishment). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id.  See also his draft of a convention with Spain, id. at 257 (detailing the role 
of the U.S. judiciary in examining the evidence against a fugitive before approving 
extradition). 
 17. Id. at 177. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 68 (1797). 
 23. Id. at 68–69. 
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that it would be an offense against the law of nations for any person 
within the United States “to go into the territory of Spain with intent 
to recover their property by their own strength, or in any other 
manner than its laws authorize and permit.”24  But the Constitution 
gave to the Legislative Branch, “in express words, the power of 
passing a law for punishing a violation of territorial rights.”25  No  law 
covered the particular dispute with Spain.26  To resolve the matter, 
Congress had to act.  The President had no independent or 
unilateral powers to transfer the offenders to Spain.27
In 1821, Attorney General William Wirt prepared a lengthy analysis 
on the President’s authority to deliver to another country subjects of 
that nation charged with offenses.28  Could the President act under 
his interpretation of the law of nations?  After exploring the major 
treatises on international law, Wirt concluded that the “duty to 
deliver up criminals is so vague and uncertain as to the offences on 
which it rests”29 that nations decided to enter into treaties to identify 
the particular crimes that would trigger extradition.30  Without 
specific authority granted by the legislative branch, either by treaty or 
statute, “the President has no power to make the delivery.”31
Attorney General Roger Taney followed similar reasoning in 1833.  
Portugal wanted two seamen, confined in Boston, turned over to face 
charges of piracy.32  Taney said that no law of Congress authorized the 
President to deliver up anyone found in the United States charged 
with having committed a crime against a foreign nation, nor was 
there any treaty stipulation with Portugal for the delivery of 
offenders.33  Congress had decided, by an act of March 3, 1819, that it 
was the duty of government to bring individuals charged with piracy 
to trial in the circuit court for the district into which they were 
brought or where they were found.34  It was not “in the power of the 
President to send them to any other tribunal, domestic or foreign, 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 69. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. at 69–70 (arguing that while failing to comply with an extradition 
request could harm diplomatic relations, current laws did not provide for such a 
process). 
 28. 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 509 (1821). 
 29. Id. at 519. 
 30. Id. at 519–20. 
 31. Id. at 521. 
 32. 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 559 (1833). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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upon the ground that evidence to convict them can more 
conveniently be obtained there.”35
In 1841, Attorney General Hugh Legaré examined whether states 
could enter into “any agreement or compact, express or implied” to 
send “fugitives from justice” back to a requesting foreign country.36  
They could not do so, he said, without the consent of Congress.37  
Moreover, executive department practice indicated that “the 
President is not considered as authorized, in the absence of any 
express provision by treaty, to order the delivering up of fugitives 
from justice.”38  It was, therefore, best “to refer the whole matter to 
Congress.”39  Legaré found that these executive power policies set by 
Jefferson “and sanctioned after the lapse of upwards of thirty years” 
were now “too solemnly settled” to disregard.40  In 1853, Attorney 
General Caleb Cushing endorsed Legaré’s opinion.41  Treaties 
stipulated that extradition must be preceded by judges and 
magistrates hearing evidence of criminality and certifying the charge 
before the President may turn the individual over to another 
country.42
 35. Id. 
 36. See 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 661, 661 (1841) (opining on a request by the Governor 
General of Canada to the Governor of New York to return a person who fled to that 
state). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 661. 
 39. Id. at 662. 
 40. Id.  For another example of an Attorney General opinion deciding, on the 
basis of a treaty and congressional statutes, that the President is authorized to send a 
fugitive from the United States to England for trial, see 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 201 (1843). 
 41. See 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 85, 86 (1853) (arguing that because it was “settled politic 
doctrine of the United States” that states should not render fugitives to other 
countries without an express agreement in place, and larceny was not included in 
any U.S.-British treaty, the United States should not ask Great Britain to return a 
larceny suspect to New York).  In other opinions, Attorney General Cushing 
recognized that the President was restricted by treaty language and judicial decisions 
in cases of extradition.  See, e.g., 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 431 (1854) (advising against 
requesting Great Britain to render a larceny suspect because larceny was not 
included in any treaties between the United States and Britain); 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 91, 
95–96 (1853) (explaining that while the President may issue a mandate to begin 
extradition proceedings, only the courts may examine the evidence to determine 
whether the extradition is warranted, and the President may not order the 
extradition without certification by a magistrate); 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 217 (1853) 
(finding that under a treaty between the United States and Prussia, as well as under 
U.S. law, extradition could not be certified without evidence providing “reasonable 
cause” to believe the allegations were true).  Attorney General Taney voiced similar 
sentiments in an 1831 opinion.  See 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 452 (1831) (stating that the 
absence of an extradition treaty precluded the President from rendering a person 
found in possession of stolen diamonds). 
 42. E.g., Treaty to Settle and Define the Boundaries Between the Territories of 
the United States and the Possessions of Her Britannic Majesty in North America; for 
the Final Suppression of the African Slave Trade; and for the Giving up of Criminals, 
Fugitives from Justice, in Certain Cases, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. X, Aug. 9, 1842, 8 Stat. 576 
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Administrations that did depart from those principles paid a 
political price.  During the Civil War, President Lincoln ordered the 
seizure of a Spanish subject (Jose Arguelles) and his return to Cuba 
for trial.43  No extradition treaty existed.44  Lincoln was rebuked in 
some quarters for exercising an “absolute despotism.”45  The Senate 
and the House requested that the Lincoln Administration explain 
what authority had permitted the President to deliver Arguelles to 
Spain.46  Secretary of State William H. Seward defended Lincoln’s 
action under “the law of nations,”47 but Article I of the Constitution 
clearly gives that power to Congress.48  New York proceeded to indict 
for kidnapping the U.S. Marshal and the four deputies who had 
seized Arguelles.49  Although the prosecution went no further, the 
damage done to Lincoln and presidential power was substantial.50  
Arguelles was convicted, fined, and sentenced to nineteen years “at 
the chain.”51
The President’s dependence on treaties and statutes to transfer 
someone to another country was well established throughout most of 
America’s history.  The Supreme Court in 1936 spoke unanimously 
(specifying that evidence be weighed under local law during the extradition 
certification hearing). 
 43. William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, The Law:  “Extraordinary Rendition” 
and Presidential Fiat, 36 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 102, 106 (2006). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2484, 2545 (1864) (adopting a 
resolution asking the President to inform them “under what authority of law or 
treaty” he had allowed the rendition); H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 38-1, at 35–37 (1865) 
(calling for a “full and careful examination” of whether the President had the 
authority to send Arguelles back to Spain). 
 47. S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 38-48, at 2 (1864).  For a more thorough analysis by 
Secretary Seward, see his June 24, 1864 letter to Rep. James F. Wilson, Chairman of 
the House Judiciary Committee, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 38-1, at 35–56 (1865). 
 48. See U.S. CONST. art. I (assigning Congress the power to “define and punish . . . 
offenses against the law of nations”). 
 49. Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 43, at 107 (recounting that the United States 
invoked a wartime statute providing that an order by the President could serve as a 
defense to prosecution in any court). 
 50. See id. at 107–08 (describing the conflict between state and federal authorities 
over the issue and the “substantial political and legal risk” that such unilateral 
executive action brought); see also EDWARD MCPHERSON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE GREAT REBELLION 355 (Washington D.C., 
Philp & Solomons 1864) (documenting a House resolution that Lincoln’s action was 
“a violation of the Constitution of the United States and of the law of nations, and in 
derogation of the right of asylum”); CHRISTOPHER H. PYLE, EXTRADITION, POLITICS, 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 102–03 (Temple Univ. Press 2001) (recalling the public outcry 
over the decision to send Arguelles back to Cuba); HENRY J. RAYMOND, THE LIFE AND 
PUBLIC SERVICES OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 564–67 (New York, Derby & Miller 1865) 
(noting that Lincoln drew criticism for the Arguelles case not only from political 
opponents but also his supporters). 
 51. H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 38-1, at 86 (1865). 
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about the President’s lack of authority to act independently and 
unilaterally in such matters: 
It rests upon the fundamental consideration that the Constitution 
creates no executive prerogative to dispose of the liberty of the 
individual.  Proceedings against him must be authorized by law.  
There is no executive discretion to surrender him to a foreign 
government, unless that discretion is granted by law.  It necessarily 
follows that as the legal authority does not exist save as it is given by 
act of Congress or by the terms of a treaty, it is not enough that 
statute or treaty does not deny the power to surrender.  It must be 
found that statute or treaty confers the power.52
In 1979, the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) reviewed the 
President’s power to transfer someone in U.S. custody to another 
country.53  The legal analysis was prompted by the revolution in Iran, 
the presence of the deposed Shah in the United States, and the call 
for his return.54  Finding no treaty authority to deport or render 
him,55 the Justice Department looked to statutory authority and found 
that it could transfer the Shah to another country but not to Iran.56  
The statute prevented the government from forcing someone to 
return to a country where he would be subject to political 
persecution, as would have been the case with the Shah.57  The legal 
rule was plain:  “The President cannot order any person extradited 
unless a treaty or statute authorizes him to do so.”58
B. Prisoners of War 
In a 2004 article, John Yoo broadly defended the President’s 
authority to transfer suspected terrorists to other countries.59  He said 
that the authority is derived from the President’s powers under 
Article II, especially the Commander-in-Chief Clause.60  In his search 
for historical examples, however, Yoo could cite to only a statute that 
granted the President authority to return French citizens to France in 
 52. Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 9 (1936). 
 53. 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 149 (1980). 
 54. Id.  
 55. See id. (noting the absence of any extradition treaty between the United 
States and Iran). 
 56. See id. at 150–52 (finding deportation permissible under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act because the Shah’s presence in the United States could be prejudicial 
to the public interest but his deportation to Iran could impermissibly place him at 
risk of political persecution). 
 57. See id. at 151–52 (referring to § 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act). 
 58. Id. at 149. 
 59. John Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183 (2004). 
 60. Id. at 1184, 1192–1205. 
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the 1790s61 and statutes authorizing retaliation against prisoners of 
war during the War of 1812.62  Transfers of prisoners of war to other 
countries sometimes put them to work on construction projects but 
did not subject them to interrogation and torture.63
According to Yoo, the President may “dispose of the liberty of 
captured enemy personnel as he sees fit,”64 relying on Article II 
powers.  At the same time, Yoo states that the President is “subject to 
certain constraints,” including treaties and international law.65  
However, those constraints may not exist if, as Yoo argues, “statutes 
and treaties must be interpreted so as to protect the President’s 
constitutional powers from impermissible encroachment and thereby 
to avoid any potential constitutional problems.”66  In short, 
presidential power will trump conflicting statutes and treaties.  On 
the other hand, presidential power to transfer military detainees 
abroad for torture is “significantly constrained” by domestic law that 
applies criminal penalties to conspiracy to commit torture outside the 
United States.67  But law enforcement is within the President’s power, 
and he may decide to tell the Attorney General not to prosecute 
offenders. 
For Yoo, the “rule of law” has two meanings.  Once the threshold of 
war is crossed, the new condition “changes the law’s form and 
substance.”68  Matters are then “governed by the laws of war.”69  In 
other words, law before the war (treaties and statutes) becomes 
subordinate to executive-made “laws of war.”  Yoo concludes, “[t]his 
is not to say that these transfers [of suspects] are wholly ungoverned 
by law.  It is only to make clear that these transfers are governed by a 
different set of rules—the laws of war—than those that apply in 
domestic, peacetime affairs.”70  This new set of rules depends on 
limitations developed wholly within the Executive Branch. 
 61. Id. at 1206. 
 62. Id. at 1211–12, 1221. 
 63. Id. at 1218 (reporting that the United States transferred prisoners of war to 
France, Belgium, and Luxembourg to work on public works projects during World 
War II). 
 64. Id. at 1222. 
 65. Id. at 1223. 
 66. Id. at 1230. 
 67. Id. at 1232. 
 68. Id. at 1235. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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C. Kidnappings 
Both before and after the 1980 OLC opinion, governments 
kidnapped and forcibly abducted individuals without treaty or 
statutory authority in order to bring them to trial.71  One scholar 
remarked on the strangeness of this practice:  “It is a crime for private 
persons to receive stolen goods, but it is lawful for American courts to 
receive stolen people.”72  Courts did not officially sanction 
kidnapping or illegal abductions, but they tolerated them under what 
is gently called the “rule of noninquiry.”73  How someone was brought 
to court did not matter.  Forcible abduction was first sanctioned by 
the Supreme Court in 1886, allowing the conviction of a man 
improperly transferred from Peru to the United States.74  It was 
reaffirmed in 1952 to bring a defendant from Illinois to Michigan.75  
Known as the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, these two cases announced that 
the government’s power to prosecute someone “is not impaired by 
the illegality of the method by which it acquires control over him.”76  
Jurisdiction obtained through “an indisputably illegal act” could be 
held by courts even though it rewarded “police brutality and 
lawlessness.”77  The continued vitality of Ker-Frisbie, however,  seemed 
undercut by the due process cases in the 1950s and 1960s78 with the 
Supreme Court objecting to government practices that “shock[] the 
conscience.”79  Some courts looked to guidance from Justice 
Brandeis’s 1928 dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States,80 when 
he warned that crime is contagious:  “If the government becomes a 
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law.”81
In 1974, the Unites States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
concluded that the Ker-Frisbie doctrine could not be “reconciled with 
 71. Michael H. Cardozo, Note and Comment, When Extradition Fails, Is Abduction 
the Solution?, 55 AM. J. INT’L L. 127 (1961); see also  D. Cameron Findlay, Abducting 
Terrorists Overseas for Trial in the United States:   Issues of International and Domestic Law, 
23 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1 (1988); G. Gregory Schuetz, Comment, Apprehending Terrorists 
Overseas Under United States and International Law:   A Case Study of the Fawaz Younis 
Arrest, 29 HARV. INT’L L.J. 499 (1988). 
 72. PYLE, supra note 50, at 263. 
 73. Id. at 6, 263–99. 
 74. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1886) (acknowledging that the 
kidnapped defendant or Peru could seek redress for the forcible seizure while 
affirming the defendant’s conviction). 
 75. See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522–23 (1952) (holding that due process 
could be satisfied by a fair trial even if the respondent was brought to court in 
violation of the Federal Kidnapping Act). 
 76. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 271 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 77. Id. at 272. 
 78. Id. at 272–75. 
 79. Id. at 273 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172–73 (1952)). 
 80. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 81. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 274 (citing 277 U.S. 438, 484–85 (1928)). 
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the Supreme Court’s expansion of the concept of due process” and 
that a court must reject jurisdiction when a defendant is brought 
before it through “the government’s deliberate, unnecessary and 
unreasonable invasion of the accused’s constitutional rights.”82  The 
circumstances of the case before the Second Circuit included 
allegations that the defendant was kidnapped in Uruguay, brought to 
Brazil for interrogation and torture, drugged by Brazilian-American 
agents, and placed on a Pan American Airways flight to the United 
States, where he was taken into custody by an Assistant U.S. 
Attorney.83  Upon remand, a district court decided (without an 
evidentiary hearing) that the defendant had failed to show that U.S. 
officials participated in the abduction or torture.84
This type of abduction, however repugnant, was for the purpose of 
bringing someone to trial.  Other cases could be cited, such as Israeli 
agents kidnapping Adolf Eichmann from Argentina in 1960 and 
bringing him to Israel to be tried.85  Because there was no extradition 
treaty between Israel and Argentina, the U.N. Security Council asked 
Israel to pay reparations to Argentina, and Israel complied.86  
Throughout the 1980s, the United States began to forcibly abduct 
alleged terrorists and drug lords in other countries and bring them to 
trial.  In 1986, President Reagan authorized the CIA to kidnap 
criminal suspects.87  As part of the U.S. intervention in Panama in 
December 1989, U.S. troops captured Antonio Noriega and brought 
him to trial in the United States.88  President George H. W. Bush 
directed that Noriega be “turned over to civil law enforcement 
officials of the United States.”89  In 1992, the Supreme Court held 
that the government may kidnap people from foreign countries to try 
them in the United States.90  The decision provoked the charge from 
domestic critics and foreign countries that U.S. presidents could act 
in defiance of international law, an impression the George H.W. Bush 
 82. Id. at 275. 
 83. Id. at 269–70. 
 84. United States v. Toscanino, 398 F. Supp. 916, 917 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (basing its 
decision on an eleven page affidavit submitted by the defendant). 
 85. PYLE, supra note 50, at 272–73. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 275. 
 88. Id. at 277–78. 
 89. Memorandum Directing the Apprehension of General Manuel Noriega and 
Others in Panama Indicted in the United States for Drug-Related Offenses, 25 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1976 (Dec. 25, 1989). 
 90. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). 
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and Clinton Administrations attempted to dispel through various 
initiatives.91
II. ADDING AN ADJECTIVE 
Putting “extraordinary” in front of rendition changes the meaning 
fundamentally.  A process formerly bound by statutory and treaty 
law—reinforced by procedural safeguards in court—now entered the 
realm of independent and arbitrary executive law.  Checks and 
balances disappeared.  Presidents claimed the right not only to act in 
the absence of statutory or treaty authority but even in violation of it.  
After 9/11, officials in the Bush Administration defended the need to 
detain and interrogate suspected terrorists outside the country.92  In 
that sense, extraordinary rendition has parallels to putting detainees 
in the U.S. military prison at Guantánamo Bay, an effort to place 
them beyond the reach of judicial supervision and review.93  
Rendition operates within the rule of law; extraordinary rendition 
falls outside.  Rendition brings suspects to federal or state court; 
extraordinary rendition does not.  The harsh and aggressive methods 
used in extraordinary rendition would undermine potential 
prosecutions because a court would exclude confessions or evidence 
that had been illegally coerced.94
A. Prohibitions on Torture 
In a series of statutes, the United States condemned torture and 
specifically prohibited the transfer of anyone to a country that 
practiced torture.  In 1992, Congress passed the Torture Victim 
Protection Act.95  The Act establishes a civil action to recover damages 
from an individual who engages in torture or extrajudicial killing.96  
Anyone who, “under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of 
 91. LOUIS FISHER & DAVID GRAY ADLER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 711 (7th 
ed. 2007) (recounting the White House press release on the day of the decision, 
congressional hearings on the abduction of foreign nationals, and negotiations 
between the United States and Mexico regarding cross-border abductions). 
 92. See infra Part III (detailing the Bush Administration’s defenses of its practice 
of extraordinary rendition). 
 93. See infra Part II.C (discussing changes to CIA practices after 9/11); see also 
infra notes 128–137 (describing some of the CIA operations that became public after 
9/11). 
 94. See infra Part II.A (defining torture); see, e.g., Dana Priest, Wrongful 
Imprisonment:   Anatomy of a CIA Mistake, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2005, at A1 [hereinafter 
Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment] (describing the standard procedure of the Rendition 
Group of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center as involving blindfolding and cutting of 
the clothes of captives before administering an enema and sleeping pills and then 
travel to a cooperative detention facility or to a covert CIA prison). 
 95. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350). 
 96. Id. § 2. 
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any foreign nation,” subjects someone to torture shall be liable for 
damages to that individual.97  The statute applied to torture 
committed by someone from a foreign nation.98
In 1998, as part of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring 
Act, Congress stated: 
It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or 
otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country 
in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of 
whether the person is physically present in the United States.99
The statute directed federal agencies to implement the obligations 
of the United States under Article 3 of the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).100  Regulations provide that if 
there is a decision to remove an alien to another country where 
torture is possible, an immigration judge must determine whether 
torture is more likely than not to occur.101
In 1998, Congress passed the Torture Victims Relief Act.102  The 
first finding states:  “The American people abhor torture by any 
government or person.  The existence of torture creates a climate of 
fear and international insecurity that affects all people.”103  The 
second finding says:  “Torture is the deliberate mental and physical 
damage caused by governments to individuals to destroy individual 
personality and terrorize society.  The effects of torture are long 
term.  Those effects can last a lifetime for the survivors and affect 
future generations.”104  The third finding explains that torture is often 
used “as a weapon against democracy.”105  Part of the statute 
authorizes funds to “use the voice and vote of the United States to 
support the work of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and the 
Committee Against Torture established under the [CAT].”106  Article 
3 of the CAT provides:  “No State Party shall expel, return 
(“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242(a), 112 Stat. 2681-761, 822 (1998) (codified at 8 
U.S.C. § 1231). 
 100. Id. § 2242(b). 
 101. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(4) (2008). 
 102. Pub. L. No. 105-320, 112 Stat. 3016 (1998) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2152). 
 103. Id. § 2(1). 
 104. Id. § 2(2). 
 105. Id. § 2(3). 
 106. Id. § 6(c)(2). 
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subjected to torture.”107  The Reagan Administration and the Senate 
added this qualification:  “[T]he United States understands the 
phrase, ‘where there are substantial grounds for believing that he 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture,’ as used in Article 3 
of the Convention, to mean ‘if it is more likely than not that he would 
be tortured.’”108  Even that looser definition would cover renditions to 
such countries as Egypt and Syria. 
B. Renditions Under Clinton 
On June 21, 1995, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision 
Directive (“PDD”) 39, setting forth the U.S. policy on 
counterterrorism.109  PPD 39 authorized the Secretary of State and the 
Attorney General to “use all legal means available to exclude from 
the United States persons who pose a terrorist threat and deport or 
otherwise remove from the United States any such aliens.”110
On September 3, 1998, Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) 
Director Louis J. Freeh advised the Senate Judiciary Committee about 
the use of force to abduct suspects to bring them to trial.111  The 
rendition process was controlled by PDD 77, “which sets explicit 
requirements for initiating this method for returning terrorists to 
stand trial in the United States.”112  He said that over the past decade 
the United States had “successfully returned 13 suspected 
international terrorists to stand trial in the United States for acts or 
planned acts of terrorism against U.S. citizens.”113  Under this 
procedure, whatever force was used in making the arrests should not 
have compromised evidence needed for trial. 
During hearings on February 2, 2000, before the Senate 
Intelligence Committee, CIA Director George Tenet described the 
rendition program:  “Since July 1998, working with foreign 
 107. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/Res/39/46/Annex 
(Dec. 10, 1984). 
 108. See S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, at 6 (1988) (transmitting a message from 
President Reagan to the Senate recommending specific reservations to the CAT); S. 
REP. NO. 101-30, 1 (1990) (requesting advice and consent from the Senate to those 
reservations). 
 109. Presidential Decision Directive 39:  U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism (June 
21, 1995), available at http://www.fas.or/irp/offdocs.pdd39.htm. 
 110. Id. at 2.  The PDD included procedures for apprehending and returning 
indicted terrorists to the United States for prosecution.  Id. at 5. 
 111. U.S. Counter-Terrorism Policy:   Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th 
Cong. 33 (1998) (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation). 
 112. Id. at 36. 
 113. Id. 
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governments worldwide, we have helped to render more than two 
dozen terrorists to justice.  More than half were associates of Osama 
Bin Ladin’s Al-Qaida organization.”114  Bringing suspects “to justice” 
implies delivering them for trial, but the phrase is somewhat vague 
and Tenet did not say that all the suspects were brought to the 
United States.  Paul Pillar, deputy chief of the CIA’s Counterterrorist 
Center, interpreted Tenet’s testimony to mean that some of the two 
dozen suspects were brought to the United States to stand trial, but 
“most were delivered to other countries where they were wanted for 
their crimes.”115  Does “wanted for crimes” mean being turned over to 
the judicial system or, instead, for interrogation and torture?  If the 
latter, it is the first step toward extraordinary rendition.  Turning 
suspects over to another country, like Egypt, means losing control 
over how the person is treated. 
At a congressional hearing on April 17, 2007, Michael Scheuer 
described his duties during the Clinton Administration as supervising 
the abduction of suspected terrorists.116  He testified that the CIA’s 
rendition program began in late summer 1995:  “I authored it and 
then ran and managed it against al-Qaeda leaders and other Sunni 
Islamists from August, 1995, until June, 1999.”117  The purpose was “to 
take men off the street who were planning or had been involved in 
attacks on the United States or its allies”118 and “to seize hard copy or 
electronic documents in their possession when arrested.”119  However, 
“interrogation was never a goal under President Clinton.”120  The men 
captured were not to be brought to the United States or held in U.S. 
custody.121  The CIA was “to take each captured al-Qaeda leader to the 
country which had an outstanding legal process for him.”122  If the 
country had not filed charges against the individual, abduction was 
 114. Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States:   Hearing Before 
the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 106th Cong. 12 (2000) (statement of George J. 
Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence Agency). 
 115. PAUL R. PILLAR, TERRORISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 118 (2001). 
 116. Extraordinary Rendition in U.S. Counterterrorism Policy:   The Impact on 
Transatlantic Relations:   J. Hearing Before Subcomm. on International Organizations, 
Human Rights, and Oversight and the Subcomm. on Europe of the H. Comm. on Foreign 
Affairs, 110th Cong. 12–41 (2007) (statement of Michael F. Scheuer, Former Chief, 
Bin Laden Unit, Central Intelligence Agency). 
 117. Id. at 12. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
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not authorized.123  “As a result, many al-Qaeda fighters we knew of 
and who were dangerous to America could not be captured.”124
Scheuer testified that “no rendered al-Qaeda leader has ever been 
kidnapped by the United States.  They have always first been either 
arrested or seized by a local security or intelligence service.”125  The 
purpose of the Bush Administration was quite different:  abduct 
suspected terrorists (with or without local help), interrogate them 
under CIA custody,126 and transfer them to another country for 
additional interrogation and most likely torture.127
C. Changes After 9/11 
Abu Ghraib put the spotlight on the CIA.  Agency officers 
conducted harsh, unsupervised interrogations at that prison and 
others.128  Newspaper reports in September 2004 disclosed that the 
agency had hidden at least two dozen detainees from Red Cross 
inspectors.129  The CIA moved these men, called “ghost detainees,” 
out of Iraqi prisons for interrogation at other undisclosed locations 
made inaccessible to the Red Cross.130  Permission for these transfers 
came from a confidential OLC draft opinion that specialists in 
international law condemned as sanctioning violations of the Geneva 
Conventions.131  There should never have been any doubt about the 
prospects of torture.  The U.S. State Department for years had 
condemned a number of countries for torturing and abusing 
detainees.  Here is the department’s description of the practices 
followed by Egypt in 2003: 
 123. See id. (noting that this rule restricted the United State’s efforts at combating 
Al-Qaeda). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 18. 
 126. See id. at 12–13 (stating that after 9/11, operatives have most often remained 
in U.S. custody and been interrogated by U.S. officers). 
 127. 151 Cong. Rec. E282 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 2005) (statement by Rep. Edward J. 
Markey). 
 128. Douglas Jehl, C.I.A. Cites Order on Supervised Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 
2004, at A7. 
 129. See, e.g., id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See Douglas Jehl, U.S. Action Bars Rights of Some Captured in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 26, 2004, at A1 (referencing the draft U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legal 
Counsel memorandum, dated March 19, 2004, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/doj_memo031904.pdf); 
Dana Priest, Memo Lets CIA Take Detainees Out of Iraq, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2004, at A1 
(describing critics as challenging the draft opinion—allowing the CIA to take Iraqis 
out of the country for brief periods and to permanently remove those deemed illegal 
aliens under local immigration law—for violating the basic rights of Article 49 of the 
Geneva Convention, which includes insurgents). 
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 [Victims were] stripped and blindfolded; suspended from a ceiling 
or doorframe with feet just touching the floor; beaten with fists, 
whips, metal rods, or other objects; subjected to electrical shocks; 
and doused with cold water.  Victims frequently reported being 
subjected to threats and forced to sign blank papers for use against 
the victim or the victim’s family in the future should the victim 
complain of abuse.  Some victims, including male and female 
detainees and children reported that they were sexually assaulted 
or threatened with rape themselves or family members.132
Beginning in December 2004, Dana Priest of the Washington Post 
wrote a series of articles describing how the CIA transported 
suspected terrorists to undisclosed locations for abusive 
interrogations beyond the reach of federal courts.133  The agency used 
a Gulfstream V turbojet, often seen “at military airports from Pakistan 
to Indonesia to Jordan.”134  At times, the suspects could be seen 
hooded and handcuffed before being boarded.135  The CIA called the 
activity “rendition,” but it was not an operation to bring suspects to 
trial.136  Human rights organizations objected that the CIA’s purpose 
was to transfer captives to countries that used brutal interrogation 
methods outlawed in the United States and in violation of the 
Convention on Torture.137
Other news reports claimed that the CIA conducted its program 
under a classified directive signed by President Bush shortly after 
9/11, allowing the agency to transport suspects without receiving 
case-by-case approval from the White House, the State Department, 
or the Justice Department.138  Former detainees, subjected to these 
transfers, described what they called “brutal” interrogation 
techniques.139  The Bush Administration, declining to confirm or 
deny the CIA program, insisted that it did not hand over people to 
face torture.140  Former government officials estimated that the 
 132. 2 DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2003 
1826–27 (2004). 
 133. See, e.g., Priest, Memo Lets CIA Take Detainees Out of Iraq, supra note 131, at A1; 
Dana Priest, Jet Is an Open Secret in Terror War, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2004, at A1 
[hereinafter Priest, Jet Is an Open Secret]. 
 134. Priest, Jet Is an Open Secret, supra note 133. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id.  See generally STEPHEN GREY, GHOST PLANE:   THE TRUE STORY OF THE CIA 
TORTURE PROGRAM (2006); TREVOR PAGLEN & A. C. THOMPSON, TORTURE TAXI:   ON 
THE TRAIL OF THE CIA’S RENDITION FLIGHTS (2006); Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture:   
The Secret History of America’s “Extraordinary Rendition” Program, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 
2005, at 106–23. 
 138. See, e.g., Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, Rule Change Lets C.I.A. Freely Send 
Suspects Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at A1. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
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agency had flown “from 100 to 150 suspected terrorists” to 
interrogation sites.141  The countries receiving suspects—Egypt, Syria, 
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Pakistan—were identified by the State 
Department as habitually using torture.142  According to an 
Administration spokesman, the CIA followed guidelines that required 
the receiving country to assure that prisoners would be treated 
humanely and that U.S. personnel would monitor compliance.143  CIA 
Director Porter Goss acknowledged that the United States had a 
limited capacity to enforce these promises:  “once they’re out of our 
control, there’s only so much we can do.”144  Former prisoners 
subjected to CIA transfers said they had been beaten, shackled, 
humiliated, subjected to electric shocks, and survived other abusive 
treatments.145  Those eventually released include Maher Arar and 
Khaled El-Masri,146 discussed later in this Article. 
III. ADMINISTRATION DEFENSES 
In October 2004, James L. Pavitt, the recently retired director of 
CIA operations worldwide, claimed that the policy of extraordinary 
rendition had been “carefully vetted and approved by the National 
Security Council and disclosed to the appropriate congressional 
oversight committees.”147  Briefings and consultation with lawmakers 
do not make an illegal program legal.  Pavitt spoke after the Justice 
Department, “at the CIA’s request, drafted a confidential memo in 
March [2004] authorizing the agency to transfer detainees out of Iraq 
for interrogation.”148  The memo concluded that the Geneva 
Conventions allowed the CIA to take Iraqis and non-Iraqis out of the 
country for questioning.149  Experts in international law rejected that 
reading of Geneva.150
On March 7, 2005, Attorney General Gonzales defended the 
practice of what was now called “extraordinary rendition.”151  
Although U.S. officials, meeting in private with reporters, referred to 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See id. (detailing the accounts of ill-treatment inflicted on various detainees). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Dana Priest, Ex-CIA Official Defends Detention Policies, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 
2004, at A21. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. R. Jeffrey Smith, Gonzales Defends Transfer of Detainees, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 
2005, at A3. 
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the threat of CIA transfers as an effective method of obtaining 
intelligence from suspected terrorists, Gonzales said that U.S. policy 
was not to send detainees “to countries where we believe or we know 
that they’re going to be tortured.”152  For countries with a history of 
torture, the Bush Administration would seek assurances that such 
techniques would not be used against detainees transferred to those 
countries.153  He conceded that the Administration “can’t fully 
control” what other nations do.154  One CIA officer involved with 
renditions called the assurances given by other countries “a farce.”155
A. European Investigations 
In February 2003, an Egyptian cleric (Abu Omar or Hassan Mustafa 
Osama Nasr) was seized by the United States on a sidewalk in Milan 
and taken out of Italy.156  Italian investigators, searching for his 
kidnappers, visited the Aviano Air Base in northern Italy and insisted 
on seeing records of any American planes that had flown into or out 
of the joint U.S.-Italian military facility around the time of the 
abduction.157  They also sought the logs of vehicles that had entered 
the base.158  Italian authorities suspected that Abu Omar was abducted 
as part of the CIA extraordinary rendition program.159  Law 
enforcement authorities in other countries, including Germany and 
Sweden, also investigated whether U.S. agents had violated their 
sovereignty by seizing suspects and transferring them to other 
locations for abusive interrogations.160
German prosecutors tried to determine who apprehended Khaled 
El-Masri, a German citizen vacationing in Macedonia.161  He was  
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See Dana Priest, CIA’s Assurances on Transferred Suspects Doubted, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 17, 2005, at A1 (quoting an anonymous CIA officer involved with renditions). 
 156. For further details on Abu Omar, see Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered 
Meaningless:   Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333, 
1340–42 (2007).  See also the writings of Leila Nadya Sadat:   Ghost Prisoners and Black 
Sites:   Extraordinary Rendition Under International Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 309 
(2006) and Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and Other Nightmares from the War on Terror, 
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200 (2007) (examining the U.S. practice of extraordinary 
rendition—transferring detainees abroad for detention and interrogation—and 
concluding that rendition does not comply with either international human rights 
norms or the laws of war). 
 157. Craig Whitlock, Europeans Investigate CIA Role in Abductions, WASH. POST, Mar. 
13, 2005, at A1. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
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taken to an American prison in Afghanistan in January 2004.162  A 
parliamentary investigation in Sweden found that CIA agents wearing 
hoods had orchestrated the December 2001 abduction of two 
Egyptian nationals, transferring them to Egypt for interrogation and 
torture.163  Swedish authorities admitted that they had invited the CIA 
to assist in the operation but vowed never again to let the agency take 
charge of such operations.164  One police chief told reporters “[i]n 
the future we will use Swedish laws, Swedish measures of force and 
Swedish military aviation when deporting terrorists.”165
News reports disclosed that the CIA had been interrogating 
suspects at secret facilities (“black sites”) in Eastern Europe.166  
Although the Washington Post knew the identities of two countries in 
Eastern Europe (later identified as Poland and Romania), it decided 
not to publish the names at the request of officials in the Bush 
Administration.167  There was also a black site in Thailand.168  Two al 
Qaeda operatives (Abu Zubaida and Ramsi Binalshibh) were kept 
there until Thai officials insisted that the facility be closed.169  Without 
affirming the existence of the secret prisons in Eastern Europe, the 
CIA asked the Justice Department to open a criminal investigation to 
determine who leaked the highly classified information to the 
Washington Post.170
In November 2005, several European governments opened 
investigations into the CIA planes that flew regularly over the 
continent to carry suspects to interrogation facilities.171  Officials in 
Spain, Sweden, Norway, and the European Parliament began formal 
inquiries and sought information from the United States about the 
CIA flights.172  Prosecutors in Italy filed a formal extradition request 
for twenty-two U.S. citizens alleged to be CIA operatives, charged with 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id.; see also Craig Whitlock, New Swedish Documents Illuminate CIA Action, WASH. 
POST, May 21, 2005, at A1 (detailing a Swedish parliamentary probe that revealed 
“degrading and inhumane” rendition practices by CIA operatives on Swedish soil). 
 166. See, e.g., Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 2, 2005, at A1. 
 167. See id. (referring only to “black sites” in “several democracies in Eastern 
Europe”).  
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. David Johnston & Carl Hulse, C.I.A. Asks for Criminal Inquiry Over Secret-Prison 
Article, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005, at A18. 
 171. Craig Whitlock, Europeans Probe Secret CIA Flights, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2005, 
at A22. 
 172. Id. 
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abducting Abu Omar.173  A German prosecutor opened a criminal 
investigation into that same abduction to determine whether the CIA 
broke German law by bringing him first to Ramstein Air Base before 
flying him to Cairo.174  Another German prosecutor began a criminal 
investigation involving the seizure of El-Masri in Macedonia.175  
Ireland and Denmark objected to the presence of CIA-operated 
aircraft in their countries.176
B. Rice Offers an Explanation 
On behalf of the European Union, British Foreign Secretary Jack 
Straw wrote to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in late November 
2005, asking her to clarify the issue of CIA detention camps in 
Europe.177  The top judicial figure in the Union warned that any E.U. 
country that hosted CIA prisons risked losing its E.U. voting rights.178  
Poland was already an E.U. member, and Romania had applied to 
join.  On the eve of Rice’s five-day trip to Europe, the New York Times 
reported that CIA-operated planes had made 307 flights in Europe 
since 9/11:  ninety-four in Germany, seventy-six in England, thirty-
three in Ireland, sixteen in Portugal, fifteen in Spain, fifteen in the 
Czech Republic, thirteen in Greece, six in Poland, five in Italy, four in 
Romania, and lesser amounts in a dozen other countries.179
In an effort to rebut criticism of extraordinary rendition, Secretary 
Rice issued a detailed statement on December 5, 2005.180  White 
House Press Secretary Scott McClellan told reporters there had been 
“an interagency input into her response.”181  The Rice statement reads 
very much like a committee product, with each agency contributing 
its agenda but no one in charge to provide accuracy, credibility, and 
coherence.  Instead of a persuasive refutation, Rice confused the CIA 
operation with traditional rendition and offered assurances that seem 
crafted by attorneys to mask meaning, conceal illegality, and insert 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Glenn Kessler, U.S. Will Address E.U. Questions on CIA Prisons, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 30, 2005, at A1. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Ian Fisher, Reports of Secret U.S. Prisons in Europe Draw Ire and Otherwise Red 
Faces, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2005, at A14. 
 180. Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks Upon Her Departure for 
Europe (Dec. 5, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/ 
57602.htm. 
 181. Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec’y, White House Press Briefing 7 
(Dec. 2, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/ 
print/20051202-2.html. 
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hidden messages.  As explained in the next thirteen points, the 
statement was much too artfully worded. 
Point One:  Rice maintained that “[f]or decades, the United States 
and other countries have used ‘renditions’ to transport terrorist 
suspects from the country where they were captured to their home 
country or to other countries where they can be questioned, held, or 
brought to justice.”182  In the past, in cases of forcible abductions of 
questionable legality, the purpose was to bring drug lords and 
suspected terrorists to trial, not for abusive interrogations.183  Point 
two:  Rice claimed that rendition “is not unique to the United States, 
or to the current administration,”184 giving two examples.  Ramzi 
Youssef was brought to the United States after being charged with the 
1993 World Trade Center bombing and a plot to blow up airlines 
over the Pacific Ocean.185  “Carlos the Jackal,” captured in Sudan, was 
brought to France.186  Those examples have nothing to do with 
extraordinary rendition.  The individuals were not taken to a secret 
interrogation center, outside the judicial process, and subjected to 
torture.  They were brought to court to face public charges, trial, 
conviction, and sentencing.187
Three:  As to charges of torture and inhumane treatment, Rice 
insisted that “[t]he United States does not permit, tolerate, or 
condone torture under any circumstances.”188  Contradicting that 
claim is the Bybee memo and reports from detainees held at Abu 
Ghraib, Kandahar, Bagram, Guantánamo, and other U.S. facilities.189  
Four:  “The United States does not transport, and has not 
transported, detainees from one country to another for the purpose 
of interrogation using torture.”190  The key word here is “purpose.”  
The Administration would argue that the primary purpose was not 
 182. Rice, supra note 180. 
 183. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (concerning a 
Mexican citizen kidnapped from Mexico and brought to the United States to stand 
trial for murder). 
 184. Rice, supra note 180. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 173 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding Ramzi 
Yousef’s conviction for charges related to the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing); 
Doreen Carvajal, Carlos the Jackal to Be Tried for Role in 4 Bombing Attacks in ‘80s, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 5, 2007, at A5 (reporting that Carlos the Jackal, already serving a life 
sentence for killing French police officers, will now be tried in connection with 
bombings that took place in the eighties).
 188. Rice, supra note 180. 
 189. See, e.g., Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Legal Counsel 
to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo200208
01.pdf. 
 190. Rice, supra note 180. 
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“interrogation using torture” but “interrogation to obtain 
intelligence,” with torture an incidental and secondary result.  Five:  
“The United States does not use the airspace or the airports of any 
country for the purpose of transporting a detainee to a country where 
he or she will be tortured.”191  Again, the Administration could say 
that the overriding purpose was to gather intelligence. 
Six:  “The United States has not transported anyone, and will not 
transport anyone, to a country when we believe he will be tortured.  
Where appropriate, the United States seeks assurances that 
transferred persons will not be tortured.”192  Torture is not eliminated 
by “beliefs” and “assurances.”  Seven:  “With respect to detainees, the 
United States Government complies with its Constitution, its laws, 
and its treaty obligations.  Acts of physical or mental torture are 
expressly prohibited.”193  The Bybee memo, as endorsed by White 
House Counsel Gonzales, did not accept restrictions imposed by 
statutes and treaties.194  Eight: 
Violations of these and other detention standards have been 
investigated and punished.  There have been cases of unlawful 
treatment of detainees, such as the abuse of a detainee by an 
intelligence agency contractor in Afghanistan or the horrible 
mistreatment of some prisoners at Abu Ghraib that sickened us all 
and which arose under the different legal framework that applies 
to armed conflict in Iraq.  In such cases the United States has 
vigorously investigated, and where appropriate, prosecuted and 
punished those responsible.195
This last point raised several issues.  Rice now stated, contrary to 
her earlier claim, that the United States did torture detainees.  Was 
this merely an unfortunate result of prison guards poorly trained and 
supervised?  Reference to “the different legal framework” appeared 
to offer a green light or justification to what was done.  As to vigorous 
investigations and punishments, no penalties were meted out to the 
civilian and military leaders who consciously crafted and approved a 
system of interrogation that waived treaty and statutory restrictions 
and would have been prohibited under the Army Field Manual.196
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Legal Counsel to 
Alberto R. Gonzales, supra note 189, at 31 (arguing that a statute or treaty 
prohibiting torture could be unconstitutional to the extent that it infringes on the 
President’s Commander in Chief authority to conduct war). 
 195. Rice, supra note 180. 
 196. JAMEEL JAFFER & AMRIT SINGH, ADMINISTRATION OF TORTURE: A DOCUMENTARY 
RECORD FROM WASHINGTON TO ABU GHRAIB AND BEYOND 42–44 (2007). 
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Nine:  “It is also U.S. policy that authorized interrogation will be 
consistent with U.S. obligations under the Convention Against 
Torture, which prohibits cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.”197  
“Consistent with” is not the same as being in compliance.  “Consistent 
with” invites administrative choice and discretion instead of being 
legally bound.  It is a matter of public record that confidential memos 
prepared by OLC and the Working Group developed policies that 
deliberately skirted statutory and treaty obligations.198
Ten:  “The intelligence so gathered has stopped terrorist attacks 
and saved innocent lives—in Europe as well as in the United States 
and other countries.  The United States has fully respected the 
sovereignty of other countries that cooperate in these matters.”199  A 
very shrewd sentence.  It implies that abusive interrogations helped 
gather intelligence that thwarted terrorist plots, helped protect 
Europe, and reminded some countries that they cooperated in the 
CIA flights and were fully complicit in what was done. 
Eleven:  “Because this war on terrorism challenges traditional 
norms and precedents of previous conflicts, our citizens have been 
discussing and debating the proper legal standards that should apply.  
President Bush is working with the U.S. Congress to come up with 
good solutions.”200  The first sentence draws attention to a new and 
different standard of interrogating detainees, apparently justifying 
harsh methods that in the past had been forbidden.  Whatever public 
discussions were underway were the result of leaks of secret memos 
and the Abu Ghraib scandal.  Far from working with Congress, 
President Bush threatened to veto the McCain anti-torture 
amendment until congressional support reached supermajorities to 
easily override a veto.201  Bush then issued a signing statement that left 
the meaning of the statutory prohibition subject to his interpretation 
of presidential authority under Article II.202
 197. Rice, supra note 180. 
 198. See, e.g., Jaffer & Singh, supra note 196, at 42–44, A-1 to A-7, A-72, A-97 to A-
97; Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice Office of Legal Counsel to William J. Haynes II, Gen.l Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of 
Def. (March 14, 2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/yoo_army 
_torture_memo.pdf. 
 199. Rice, supra note 180. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See Eric Schmitt et al., President Backs McCain on Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 
2005, at A1 (reporting that Bush reluctantly agreed to back the McCain amendment 
after a veto threat was met with intense bipartisan congressional resistance). 
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Twelve:  “The United States is a country of laws.  My colleagues and 
I have sworn to support and defend the Constitution of the United 
States.  We believe in the rule of law.”203  It is true that the United 
States is a country of laws and that Rice and her colleagues took an 
oath to support and defend the Constitution.  It is also true that key 
Administration officials, in secret, regularly rejected the binding 
nature of statutes and treaties and accepted the President’s 
“inherent” authority as superior to legislative and judicial 
constraints.204
Thirteen:  “It is up to those governments and their citizens to 
decide if they wish to work with us to prevent terrorist attacks against 
their own country or other countries, and decide how much sensitive 
information they can make public.  They have a sovereign right to 
make that choice.”205  A rather gratuitous concession that allies in 
Europe and elsewhere are sovereign countries capable of governing 
themselves.  Also, it appears to be a somewhat veiled warning that it 
would not be in their interest to publicly release information about 
CIA flights and the scope of their cooperation.  She added a similar 
note of caution:  “Debate in and among democracies is natural and 
healthy.  I hope that that debate also includes a healthy regard for 
the responsibilities of governments to protect their citizens.”206  
Translation:  Being too open has a downside; countries in Europe 
should understand the need to keep CIA operations secret. 
C. How Allies Reacted 
Press accounts clarified some points.  When Rice said the United 
States always respects the sovereignty of foreign countries when 
conducting intelligence operations on their soil (or over it), 
executive officials translated that as diplomatic code that the United 
States had received permission for the CIA activities.207  A member of 
the German Parliament’s foreign policy committee remarked:  “She’s 
trying to throw the ball back into the European field.”208  After public 
disclosure of the prison camps, ABC News reported that two of the 
facilities had been closed and eleven top al Qaeda detainees 
 203. Rice, supra note 180. 
 204. See supra note 198 (highlighting documents in which the United States 
avoided obligations resulting from its treaties and statutes). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Glenn Kessler, Rice Defends Tactics Used Against Suspects, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 
2005, at A1. 
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transported out of Europe before Rice’s arrival.209  They may have 
been moved to new CIA camps in the North African desert.210
Although Rice did not formally acknowledge the CIA program, she 
did so implicitly.  A reporter noted, “[w]ithout the debate over the 
covert jails, there would have been no reason for her statement.”211  
To a Conservative member of the British Parliament, her statement 
“was drafted by lawyers with the intention of misleading an 
audience.”212  A Labor member of the British Parliament found her 
assertions “wholly incredible.”213  A U.S. editorial dismissed Rice’s 
statement as “the same legalistic jujitsu and morally obtuse double 
talk that led the Bush Administration into a swamp of human rights 
abuses in the first place.”214
Some European leaders were offended by what they found to be a 
patronizing tone in Rice’s statement, with the United States claiming 
a superior capacity to deal with events after 9/11.215  The Conservative 
member from England said he “resent[ed] the fact that [his] country 
is foolishly being led into a misguided approach into combating 
terrorism by this administration.”216  European countries had “far 
greater experience over many decades dealing with terrorism, and 
many of us have learned the hard way that dealing in a muscular way 
can often inflame the very terrorism you’re trying to suppress.”217
Toward the end of Rice’s trip, European leaders began to fall in 
line, uniformly expressing their satisfaction with her explanations.  
Bernard Bot of the Netherlands said she “has covered basically all of 
our concerns,” dismissing talk about secret prisons as “pure 
speculation.”218  Rice had “made it quite clear” that the United States 
did not violate international law.219  To German Foreign Minister 
Walter Steinmeier, Rice had “reiterated that in the United States 
international obligations are not interpreted differently than in 
Europe.”220  (That could mean that European countries and the 
 209. Id. 
 210. Joel Brinkley, U.S. Interrogations Are Saving European Lives, Rice Says, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 6, 2005, at A3. 
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Dec. 7, 2005, at A25 (quoting Andrew Tyrie). 
 213. See id. (quoting Andrew Mullin). 
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United States jointly agreed to violate international law.)  NATO 
Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer announced that Rice had 
“cleared the air.”221  What became clear was not Rice’s explanations 
but the inability of European leaders to exercise any level of 
independent thought. 
D. At Last:  Coming Clean 
When Rice returned from her trip to Europe, the State 
Department reiterated that it would deny the International 
Committee of the Red Cross access to “a very small, limited number” 
of prisoners held in secret around the world.222  An inadvertent 
confirmation of what she had denied?  A lengthy story in the 
Washington Post on December 30, 2005, described the survival of 
secret CIA prisons, with some closed down in Europe and detainees 
transferred to other locations:  “[V]irtually all the programs continue 
to operate largely as they were set up.”223  In April 2006, investigators 
for the European Parliament reported that the CIA had flown 1000 
undeclared flights over European territory since 2001.224  They said at 
times the planes stopped to pick up suspects and take them to other 
countries for torture.225
Dick Marty, a Swiss lawyer working for the Council of Europe, 
released findings in June 2006, concluding that at least nine 
European nations colluded with the CIA to capture and secretly 
transfer suspected terrorists.226  In addition to Poland and Romania, 
he listed Bosnia, Britain, Germany, Italy, Macedonia, Sweden, and 
Turkey.227  Five other nations—Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and 
Spain—allowed CIA-chartered flights to land at their airports and 
transfer detainees to other locations.228  The investigation, conducted 
without subpoena powers, could not provide hard facts to establish 
the existence of secret prisons.  Instead, it relied on flight data and 
 221. Id.; see also Joel Brinkley, Rice Appears to Reassure Some Europeans on Treatment of 
Terror Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2005, at A6 (reporting on Rice’s trip to Europe 
and the seemingly satisfied response of foreign leaders). 
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satellite photos to make the case.229  For example, a Boeing jet with 
tail number N313P departed Kabul, Afghanistan, on September 22, 
2003, landed in Szymany, Poland, remained there for sixty-four 
minutes, and continued to Bucharest, Romania, and Rabat, 
Morocco.230  The eight locations frequently cited for the conduct of 
abusive interrogations were identified:  Algiers; Amman, Jordan; 
Baghdad; Cairo; Islamabad, Pakistan; Kabul; Rabat; and Tashkent, 
Uzbekistan.231
The Bush Administration had taken pains not to acknowledge 
extraordinary rendition.  After publication of the detailed report by 
the Council of Europe, President Bush confirmed the existence of 
the CIA program during a news conference on June 9, 2006.232  He 
was asked point-blank:  “This week, a report from the European 
Council talked about some CIA flights, illegal CIA flights with the 
prisoners in Europe, and illegal CIA presence also in some European 
countries.  Have these flights taken place, and did you discuss this in 
your meeting today?”233  Evidently prepared for the question, Bush 
said that “in cases where we’re not able to extradite somebody who is 
dangerous, sometimes renditions take place.  It’s been a part of our 
Government for quite a period of time—not just my Government, but 
previous administrations have done so in order to protect people.”234  
Bush did not explain that previous renditions were for the purpose of 
bringing suspects to trial. 
The decision to close down (at least temporarily) the CIA prisons 
was triggered in part by the Supreme Court’s June 2006 decision in 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.235  The Court ruled that detainees must be 
protected by the Geneva Conventions, including the provisions of 
Common Article 3 and its prohibitions on torture and humiliating, 
degrading treatment.236  The FBI and the CIA had clashed repeatedly 
over methods of interrogation.  FBI agents insisted that persuasion 
was more effective in obtaining intelligence than coercive 
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 230. Id. 
 231. Id.; see also Stephen Grey & Doreen Carvajal, Secret Prisons in 2 Countries Held 
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techniques.237  CIA officials insisted on tougher, more aggressive 
approaches.238  Over time, the CIA prevailed.239
On September 6, 2006, in a lengthy statement, President Bush 
provided details of the CIA rendition program.240  In addition to the 
suspects held at Guantánamo, “a small number of suspected terrorist 
leaders and operatives captured during the war have been held and 
questioned outside the United States, in a separate program operated 
by the Central Intelligence Agency.”241  He claimed that information 
obtained from these interrogations “saved innocent lives by helping 
us stop new attacks—here in the United States and across the 
world.”242  He insisted that the CIA “procedures were designed to be 
safe, to comply with our laws, our Constitution, and our treaty 
obligations.”243  Fourteen men held in CIA custody would be 
transferred to Guantánamo, where questioning would comply with 
the new Army Field Manual.244
Bush’s announcement put an end to Rice’s efforts to dissemble 
and misrepresent the CIA program.  Her counterparts in Europe 
were similarly discredited.  Sarah Ludford, a British member of the 
European Parliament and vice chairman of a parliamentary inquiry 
into the secret prisons, said that Bush “has now left the Europeans 
high and dry.”245  British Prime Minister Tony Blair, she noted, “can 
be as loyal as he likes to George Bush, but George Bush, when it suits 
him, will turn around and pull the rug out from under his feet.”246  
Javier Solana, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, announced 
that “no country in the E.U., or candidate country, as far as I know, 
has had secret prisons.”247  The issue was not simply having secret 
prisons.  It was the willingness of E.U. countries to assist in 
transferring suspects to secret prisons for torture.  A November 2006 
report by the European Parliament confirmed that “many 
governments cooperated passively or actively” with the CIA and knew 
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that individuals were being abducted and transported to places for 
illegal interrogation methods.248  When released in February 2007, the 
report admonished fifteen European nations and Turkey for helping 
the CIA. 
In addition to the fourteen men transferred to Guantánamo, 
others had been held in CIA custody and subjected to interrogation 
methods that would have been prohibited for the U.S. military.  
Marwan Jabour, picked up in May 2004, endured more than two years 
of incarceration, including being beaten and burned in Pakistan.249  
He was moved to other CIA facilities, including one in Afghanistan.250  
Released on June 30, 2006, at a border crossing between Israel and 
Gaza, he was never charged with anything or told why he was now 
being set free.251  Following the transfer of the fourteen men, the 
Bush Administration continued to have suspected terrorists seized 
and placed in CIA custody overseas, with some moved to 
Guantánamo.252
E. Italian and German Investigations 
In October 2006, prosecutors in Italy sought the indictment of 
Nicolo Pollari, the head of military intelligence (Sismi) since 2001.253  
He was charged with complicity in the abduction of Abu Omar by 
U.S. intelligence agents.254  The investigation targeted government 
officials who had cooperated with the United States in violation of 
the laws of Italy.  Twenty-five operatives of the CIA were also named 
in the case.255  A month later, Pollari lost his job.256  Also removed 
from their positions were General Mario Mori, head of Italy’s civilian 
intelligence agency, and Emilio Del Mese, a national intelligence 
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coordinator.257  Testimony in the trial disclosed details about who 
participated in the abductions and how they were carried out.258  In 
February 2007, Italy indicted twenty-six Americans (most of them CIA 
officers) for the abduction of Abu Omar.259  At the same time, the 
Swiss government authorized an investigation into the flight that was 
said to have carried him from Italy to Germany through Swiss 
airspace before landing in Egypt.260  On February 28, 2007, the State 
Department announced that the United States would refuse to 
extradite CIA officers to Italy on the kidnapping charges.261
In late January 2007, German prosecutors issued arrest warrants for 
thirteen CIA operatives involved in the kidnapping of Khaled El-
Masri in Macedonia.262  According to hotel records and flight logs, the 
crew of the CIA plane that took El-Masri to Afghanistan stayed for a 
few days at the Spanish resort island of Majorca.263  Although most of 
them used aliases, the hotel records show their passport numbers, 
hotel bills, and aviation records.264  News reports called attention to 
another German citizen, Mohammed Haydar Zammar, who was 
arrested in Morocco and secretly transferred to Syria with the help of 
the CIA, assisted by German federal police.265  In September 2007, 
German authorities dropped their efforts to have the thirteen CIA 
agents extradited to Germany.266  U.S. officials made it clear they 
would not cooperate.  However, the arrest warrants remained in 
effect in the event the CIA employees decided to travel to Germany 
or elsewhere in the European Union.267
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IV. LITIGATION 
In court, the Bush Administration told federal judges that 
terrorism suspects held in secret CIA prisons should not be permitted 
to reveal the “alternative interrogation methods” used to obtain 
information.268  Revealing those techniques “could reasonably be 
expected to cause extremely grave damage” to the nation.269  One 
lawsuit involved Majid Khan, a twenty-six-year-old Pakistani national 
who lived in the United States for seven years.270  He was seized in 
Pakistan, held in CIA prison camps, and eventually moved to 
Guantánamo as part of the group of fourteen.271  In other cases, the 
Administration argued that individuals subjected to extraordinary 
rendition were barred from litigating their grievances because it 
would risk the disclosure of state secrets and encroach on 
independent presidential authority.272  As argued in one Justice 
Department brief, the state secrets privilege “is based on the 
President’s Article II power to conduct foreign affairs and to provide 
for the national defense, and therefore has constitutional 
underpinnings.”273  Of course this is an assertion, not a fact, and has 
constitutional underpinnings only if the assertion finds support in 
court or in Congress.  Otherwise, it is a mere claim by a self-interested 
branch. 
A. Maher Arar 
Born in Syria, Maher Arar moved to Canada with his parents when 
he was 17, studied at McGill University and the University of Quebec, 
and obtained a Master’s degree in telecommunications.274  He 
married in 1994, had a daughter in 1997, and worked in Ottawa and 
Boston.275  He returned to Ottawa in 2001 to start his own consulting 
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firm.276  A second child came in 2002.277  He is a dual citizen of Syria 
and Canada.278
In September 2002, he was with his wife and children vacationing 
in Tunis.279  In response to a request from his former employer, he 
returned alone to Ottawa to consult with a prospective client.280  On 
September 26, 2002, he boarded an American Airlines flight from 
Zurich to JFK airport in New York, arriving there at two o’clock in the 
afternoon en route to Montreal.281  He was pulled aside at 
immigration after his name was entered into the computer, 
fingerprinted and photographed, and denied the opportunity to 
make a phone call to his family or an attorney.282  He was kept at the 
airport until midnight and questioned by the New York Police 
Department and FBI agents.283  Questioning continued the next day, 
when he was transferred to the Metropolitan Detention Center.284  He 
learned that he was suspected of being a member of a foreign 
terrorist organization.285
On October 2, he was allowed to make a two-minute phone call 
and reached his mother-in-law in Ottawa, telling her of his fear of 
being deported to Syria.286  Over the next few days he met with his 
lawyer and a Canadian consul.287  He told U.S. officials that he wanted 
to continue to Canada and that if he were sent to Syria he would be 
tortured.288  He had every reason to fear torture.  Country reports 
prepared by the State Department consistently referred to Syria as “a 
military regime with virtually absolute authority in the hands of the 
President,” a weak Parliament, and a judiciary with no independent 
powers over issues of national security.289  The security forces 
committed “serious human rights abuses.”290  Torture methods 
included 
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administering electrical shocks; pulling out fingernails; forcing 
objects into the rectum; beating, sometimes while the victim is 
suspended from the ceiling; hyperextending the spine; bending 
the detainees into the frame of a wheel and whipping exposed 
body parts; and using a chair that bends backwards to asphyxiate 
the victim or fracture the victim’s spine.291
Despite this clear understanding of how Syria treats prisoners, the 
commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) 
in Washington, D.C. certified that Arar’s removal to Syria was 
consistent with Article 3 of the CAT.292  After about a week at the 
Metropolitan Detention Center, U.S. officials flew him to 
Washington, D.C. and from there to Amman, Jordan, where he was 
blindfolded, chained, and put in a van.293  Whenever he tried to move 
or talk he was beaten.294  On October 9 he was driven to Damascus, 
Syria, and imprisoned at the Palestine Branch of the Syrian military 
intelligence.295  He was placed in a cell, called a “grave,” where he 
would remain for months.296  It measured “three feet wide, six feet 
deep, and seven feet high.”297  It had a metal door that prevented 
light from entering.298  There was “no light source in the cell.”299  
From October 11 to 16 he was taken for interrogation and “beaten on 
his palms, wrists, lower back and hips with a shredded black electrical 
cable . . . about two inches in diameter.”300  His interrogators 
threatened him with electric shocks and with a car tire “into which 
prisoners are stuffed, immobilized, and beaten.”301  Under those 
conditions, he falsely confessed that he received military training in 
Afghanistan.302  In the second week he was forced into the tire, 
immobilized, but not beaten.303
On October 23, he met with a Canadian consul after being warned 
not to say anything about the beatings.304  In early November he was 
told to sign and place his thumbprint on every page of a hand-written 
document about seven pages long.305  Not allowed to read this 
 291. Id. at 2109. 
 292. GREY, supra note 137, at 68. 
 293. MaherArar.ca, Chronology of Events, supra note 283, at 4. 
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document, he was also forced to sign and place his thumbprint on 
other documents.306  From October 23, 2002 to February 8, 2003, he 
met six times with the Canadian consul.307  In early April, he was 
placed in an outdoor court, the first time in six months that he had 
seen sunlight.308  A seventh visit with the Canadian consul took place 
on August 14, when for the first time he described his cell and the 
beatings.309  Five days later he was forced to sign and put his 
thumbprint on a page that said he went to a training camp in 
Afghanistan.310  Afterwards he was transferred to a cell, twelve feet by 
twenty feet, with about fifty other people.311  On August 20, he was 
transferred to Sednaya prison and placed in a collective cell.312
In late September, Arar was returned to the Palestine Branch and 
kept there for seven days.313  At a court hearing, the prosecutor read 
from his confession.314  Arar objected that he was forced to say he 
went to Afghanistan, but the court ignored his remarks.315  He was 
forced to sign and put his fingerprint on another document.316  He 
was brought back to the Palestine Branch, driven to the Canadian 
embassy, and then taken to the Canadian consul’s house to shower 
before flying out of Syria and returning to Canada.317
Arar was never formally charged with anything.318  Syria found no 
evidence linking him with terrorism.319  On what possible grounds 
could the United States justify sending him to a country it regards as 
a terrorist nation?  Why entrust the questioning of a supposed 
terrorist to Syrian interrogators?  Was Syria now a surrogate or ally of 
the United States in gaining intelligence?  What was Syria promised 
in return?  The United States regularly reminds other nations about 
the importance of safeguarding democracy, protecting the rule of 
law, and respecting human rights and human dignity.  The 
extraordinary rendition of Maher Arar violated all of these principles.  
An expert who assisted in Canada’s investigation of the Arar 
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 307. Id. at 6–7. 
 308. Id. at 7. 
 309. Id. at 8. 
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abduction concluded that his treatment at the Palestine Branch 
“constituted torture as understood in international law.”320
Arar filed a civil suit seeking money damages and declaratory relief 
from a number of U.S. officials in their individual and official 
capacities.321  On January 18, 2005, the Justice Department filed a 
memorandum in support of the state secrets privilege, claiming that 
the documents sought by Arar were “properly classified” and that 
disclosure “would interfere with foreign relations, reveal intelligence-
gathering sources or methods, and be detrimental to national 
security.”322  Did the Bush Administration know about the methods 
used by Syria?  The government asked the court to dismiss Arar’s case 
and enter judgment in favor of all U.S. officials, both in their 
individual and official capacities.323
On February 16, 2006, a federal district court held that Arar lacked 
standing to bring a claim against U.S. officials who were responsible 
for holding him incommunicado at the U.S. border and removing 
him to Syria for detention and torture.324  The court ruled that he 
failed to meet the statutory requirements of the Torture Victim 
Protection Act of 1992.325  Any access to remedies was foreclosed, the 
court said, because of national security and foreign considerations.326  
The decision states that the INS Regional Director, J. Scott Blackman, 
determined from available information that Arar was “clearly and 
unequivocally a member of al Qaeda and, therefore, clearly and 
unequivocally inadmissible to the United States.”327  Although that 
determination was based on information later shown to be false, 
Blackman ordered Arar sent to Syria without review by an 
immigration judge.328  Part of the defense by the Bush Administration 
is that “the alleged torture occurred while Arar was in Syrian 
custody,” but U.S. officials knew that he would be subjected to torture 
there and may have sent him there for that very reason.329
 320. COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION 
TO MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF PROFESSOR STEPHEN J. TOOPE, FACT FINDER 17 (2005),  
available at http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/003/008/099/003008-disclaimer.html?orig= 
/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/maher_arar/06-1213/www.ararcommission.ca 
/eng/ToopeReport_final.pdf.  
 321. Ian Austen, Canada Will Pay $9.75 Million to Man Sent to Syria and Tortured, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2007, at A5. 
 322. Memorandum in Support of the United States’ Assertion of State Secrets 
Privilege at 2–3, Arar v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-249-DGT-VVP (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2005). 
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At the end of the decision, the court examined the Bush 
Administration’s claim that Arar’s lawsuit threatened national 
security and foreign policy considerations.  Holding that courts “must 
proceed cautiously” in reviewing policy-making issues that are the 
prerogative of the Legislative and Executive Branches, it noted that 
Congress had “yet to take any affirmative position on federal-court 
review of renditions,” even though it had passed many statutes 
prohibiting torture.330  The court emphasized the importance of 
secrecy in national security and foreign affairs:  “One need not have 
much imagination to contemplate the negative effect on our 
relations with Canada if discovery were to proceed in this case and 
were it to turn out that certain high Canadian officials had, despite 
public denials, acquiesced in Arar’s removal to Syria.”331  As it turned 
out, Canada reached that conclusion and publicly apologized to 
Arar.332
The court warned that “an erroneous decision [by the judiciary] 
can have adverse consequences in the foreign realm not likely to 
occur in the domestic context.”333  In this case, the erroneous decision 
and adverse consequences had already occurred—by the Executive 
Branch.  Having decided statutory and constitutional claims against 
Arar, the court ruled that “the issue involving state secrets is moot.”334  
Arar’s complaint about his thirteen day detention within the United 
States, denial of counsel, and being subject to coercive and 
involuntary custodial interrogation was dismissed without prejudice, 
permitting Arar to reargue those claims and present additional 
evidence.335
Seven months after the district court’s ruling, a three-volume, 822-
page judicial report in Canada concluded that Canadian intelligence 
officials had passed false warnings and bad information about Arar to 
the United States.336  Agents of the Canadian intelligence services, 
under pressure after 9/11 to find terrorists, falsely labeled him as a 
dangerous radical.337  The report found that Arar had no involvement 
in Islamic extremism and that “‘categorically there is no evidence’ 
 330. Id. at 281. 
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 332. Ian Austen, Canadians Fault U.S. for Its Role in Torture Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
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27, 2007, at A14 [hereinafter Struck, Tortured Man Gets Apology from Canada]. 
 333. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 282. 
 334. Id. at 287. 
 335. Id. at 287–88. 
 336. Struck, Tortured Man Gets Apology from Canada, supra note 332. 
 337. Id. 
  
1442 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1405 
                                                          
that Arar did anything wrong or was a security threat.”338  The United 
States refused to cooperate in the inquiry.339  Cleared by Canada, Arar 
remained on America’s “watch list” as a terrorist threat to the United 
States.340
On January 26, 2007, Prime Minister Stephen Harper of Canada 
released a letter of apology to Maher Arar and his family.341  The 
government accepted all twenty-three recommendations in the 
judicial report, sent letters to both the Syrian and U.S. governments 
formally objecting to the treatment of Arar, and provided $9.75 
million in compensation.342  In August 2007, newly released sections 
of Canada’s judicial report indicated that Canadian intelligence 
officials anticipated that the United States would send Arar to a third 
country to be tortured and that neither the Syrian government nor 
the FBI were convinced he was a significant security threat.343  His 
treatment appeared triggered by the “coerced confession of Ahmad 
Abou el-Maati, a Kuwaiti-born Canadian who was also imprisoned and 
tortured in Syria.”344  Arar appealed his case to the Second Circuit.345
B. Khaled El-Masri 
Khaled El-Masri was born in Kuwait in 1963 to Lebanese parents.346  
He grew up in Lebanon, moved to Germany in 1985, and became a 
German citizen in 1995.347  At the end of 2003, he traveled to Skopje, 
Macedonia, for vacation.348  He was detained by Macedonian border 
officials on December 31 because of confusion over his name.349  They 
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thought he was Khalid al-Masri, a suspect from the al-Qaeda 
Hamburg cell.350  There was suspicion (later shown to be false) that 
El-Masri’s German passport was a forgery.351  The Macedonians 
detained him until January 23, 2004, when they transferred him to 
CIA agents.352  They flew him to a secret prison called the “Salt Pit” in 
Kabul, Afghanistan, where he was held for five months in squalid 
conditions.353  He was repeatedly refused counsel or access to a 
representative of the German government.354
Months later, the CIA concluded that his passport was genuine, 
and the United States had imprisoned the wrong man.355  A former 
senior intelligence officer remarked, “[w]hatever quality control 
mechanisms were in play on September 10th were eliminated on 
September 11th.”356  On May 28, U.S. officials flew El-Masri from 
Kabul to Albania and left him alone, at night, on a hill.357  Three 
uniformed men drove him to the Tirana airport where he boarded a 
plane to Frankfurt.358  Upon reaching home in Ulm, he learned that 
his family, after he failed to return from his holiday in Macedonia, 
had moved to Lebanon.359  They returned to Germany and were 
reunited.360
On December 6, 2005, El-Masri sued CIA Director George Tenet, 
the airlines used by the CIA, and current and former employees of 
the agency.361  The Bush Administration asserted the state secrets 
privilege to block the litigation from moving to discovery and access 
to government documents.362  The new CIA Director, Porter Goss, 
 350. Khalid El-Masri, http://en.wikipedia.org.wiki/Khalid_El-Masri (last visited 
May 20, 2008).  
 351. Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 94. 
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El-Masri contends he was at the “Salt Pit” and describing it as “an abandoned brick 
factory”); Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 94 (noting that the cellar the CIA 
kept El-Masri in was dirty and cold). 
 354. See El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 532–33 (claiming that while El-Masri was 
imprisoned in a hotel room he was refused contact with a lawyer and various German 
officials). 
 355. Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 94. 
 356. Id. 
 357. Scott Shane, German Held in Afghan Jail Files Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2005, 
at A25. 
 358. Dana Priest, The Wronged Man: Unjustly Imprisoned and Mistreated, Khaled al-
Masri Wants Answers the U.S. Government Doesn’t Want to Give, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 
2006, C1, C14. 
 359. Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 94. 
 360. Id. 
 361. El-Masri v. Tenet, No. 1:05-cv-01417-TSE-TRJ (E.D. Va. 2005) (complaint 
filed); Shane, supra note 357. 
 362. Id. (formal claim of state secrets privilege by Porter J. Goss, Director, Central 
Intelligence Agency). 
  
1444 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1405 
                                                          
stated that clandestine intelligence activities, by “their very nature,” 
are not acknowledged by the United States and that it was necessary 
to protect “classified intelligence sources and methods from 
unauthorized disclosure and thereby avoid damage to the national 
security and our nation’s conduct of foreign affairs.”363  How much 
damage to the United States had been done by the rendition?  To 
Goss, neither El-Masri nor his attorneys “possess[ed] the need-to-
know required to access the classified information described in this 
declaration.”364
On May 12, 2006, a federal district court held that the state secrets 
privilege was validly asserted and dismissed El-Masri’s case.365  Judge 
Thomas S. Ellis presented a confused account of the constitutional 
role assigned to the courts.  On the one hand he said that 
 [C]ourts must not blindly accept the Executive Branch’s assertion 
[of state secrets] . . . but must instead independently and carefully 
determine whether, in the circumstances, the claimed secrets 
deserve the protection of the privilege. . . .  [T]he depth of [the] 
court’s inquiry increases relative to the adverse party’s need for the 
information the government seeks to protect. . . .  [C]ourts must 
carefully scrutinize the assertion of the privilege lest it be used by 
the government to shield “material not strictly necessary to prevent 
injury to national security.”366
On the other hand, Ellis stated that “courts must also bear in mind 
the Executive Branch’s preeminent authority over military and 
diplomatic matters”367 and must accept the Executive’s privilege 
claim.  
 [W]henever its independent inquiry discloses a “reasonable danger 
that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, 
in the interest of national security, should not be divulged”368 . . . .  
Once a court is satisfied that the claim is validly asserted, the 
privilege is not subject to a judicial balancing of the various 
interests at stake.369
Judge Ellis then introduced a balancing test:  “El-Masri’s private 
interests must give way to the national interest in preserving state 
secrets.”370  How could one individual’s “private” interest ever 
outweigh the claimed interest of the entire government or the 
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nation?  It depends on how one defines national interest.  There was 
no national interest in picking up the wrong person and keeping him 
in prison for five months, with no ability to seek damages and no 
opportunity to force the government to concede a mistake and make 
restitution.  El-Masri was not merely defending his own interests.  He 
represented every individual, U.S. citizen or alien, who wants to avoid 
a like fate.  It is in the national interest to prevent government abuse, 
especially when covered up by the state secrets privilege.  It is in the 
national interest to have other branches of government, in this case 
the judiciary, independently supervise and judge unilateral and 
illegal executive actions.  It is in the national interest to have an 
effective system of checks and balances and a separation of powers 
instead of a concentration of power. 
At the end of his decision, Judge Ellis cautioned that nothing in his 
“ruling should be taken as a sign of judicial approval or disapproval 
of rendition programs; it is not intended to do either.”371  However, by 
accepting the state secrets privilege as readily as he did, he removed 
any opportunity for judicial check, scrutiny, or constraint on the 
extraordinary rendition program.  The “propriety and efficacy” of the 
program, he said, “are not proper grist for the judicial mill.”372  Why 
not?  What prevents courts from independently scrutinizing and 
passing judgment on abusive, illegal, and unconstitutional actions by 
the Executive Branch? 
Putting the legal issues to the side, Judge Ellis said 
 [I]f El-Masri’s allegations [were] true, or essentially true, then all 
fair-minded people, including those who believe that the state 
secrets must be protected, that this lawsuit cannot proceed, and 
that renditions are a necessary step to take in this war, must also 
agree that El-Masri has suffered injuries as a result of our country’s 
mistake and deserves a remedy.373
The source of that remedy, he said, “must be the Executive Branch 
or the Legislative Branch, not the Judicial Branch.”374  There is no 
reason to expect a remedy from an Executive Branch that initiated 
the program and attempted to block any litigation questioning it.  If 
there are legitimate questions of illegality and unconstitutionality, the 
courts are as qualified as Congress to render a judgment.  To have 
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courts look the other way does not promote the rule of law or respect 
for the courts.375
German investigators disclosed that they had obtained a list of 
about twenty CIA operatives suspected in the abduction of El-Masri, 
but the U.S. government failed to cooperate or give any assistance.376  
Prosecutors in Germany received the list from Spanish judicial 
authorities, who put it together based on a flight manifest of the 
airplane that stopped in Palma, on the island of Majorca, before 
flying to Skopje to pick up El-Masri.377
El-Masri appealed his case to the Fourth Circuit.378  Writing for a 
unanimous panel on March 2, 2007, Judge Robert B. King noted two 
developments that occurred after the district court’s decision:  (1) a 
June 7, 2006 draft report by the Council of Europe substantially 
affirming El-Masri’s account of his rendition and (2) the public 
admission by President Bush three months later that the CIA 
program existed.379  Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the 
decision by Judge Ellis.380  In so doing, it offered three arguments. 
The first:  “This inquiry is a difficult one, for it pits the judiciary’s 
search for truth against the Executive’s duty to maintain the nation’s 
security.”381  The judiciary cannot search for truth if it accepts the 
assertion of state secrets and blocks access to disputed documents 
and eliminates the adversary process that is designed for truth-
seeking.  Abusive, illegal, and unconstitutional actions by the 
Executive Branch do not maintain national security.  They 
undermine it.  To allow the Executive Branch to engage in 
extraordinary rendition and torture serves to recruit terrorists and 
spread hate against the United States. 
Second:  the Fourth Circuit claimed that the judiciary does not 
abdicate its powers on state secrets cases.382  In fact, it does.  Consider 
this passage: 
The Reynolds Court recognized this tension, observing that 
“[j]udicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated 
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to the caprice of executive officers”—no matter how great the 
interest in the national security—but the President’s ability to 
preserve state secrets likewise cannot be placed entirely at the 
mercy of the courts. . . .  Moreover, a court evaluating a claim of 
privilege must “do so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing 
the privilege is designed to protect.”383
Evidence is not “disclosed” when a court insists that sensitive 
documents be given to the trial judge to be examined in camera.  
Accepting assertions by one side is abdication, which is what the 
Fourth Circuit did:  “[I]n certain circumstances a court may conclude 
that an explanation by the Executive of why a question cannot be 
answered would itself create an unacceptable danger of injurious 
disclosure.  In such a situation, a court is obliged to accept the 
[E]xecutive [B]ranch’s claim of privilege without further demand.”384
The Fourth Circuit rejected El-Masri’s argument that the state 
secrets privilege represents a surrender of judicial control over access 
to documents:  “As we have explained, it is the court, not the 
Executive, that determines whether the state secrets privilege has 
been properly invoked.”385  It is indeed the court that makes that 
determination, but it cannot decide in an informed manner unless it 
asks for and examines Executive Branch documents.  Deferring to 
Executive Branch declarations and statements (classified or 
unclassified) weakens judicial control.  Both the district court and the 
Fourth Circuit depended on a “Classified Declaration” that 
summarized Executive Branch claims without allowing judges to read 
the underlying documents.386  Under those conditions, courts operate 
largely in the dark. 
Third:  the Fourth Circuit concluded that El-Masri “suffers this 
reversal not through any fault of his own, but because his personal 
interest in pursuing his civil claim is subordinated to the collective 
interest in national security.”387  There is no collective interest in what 
the government did to El-Masri.  National interest is not advanced by 
apprehending and detaining the wrong people and letting the 
executive officials who committed the mistake remain unaccountable 
and at liberty to repeat the error.  There is no collective interest in 
having the United States abuse innocent people while the world 
passes judgment on the health and vitality of the U.S. political and 
legal system.  Nor is the legal dispute between one person and the 
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collective interest.  No litigant could ever prevail with that test.  The 
conflict is between the interests raised by El-Masri for all potential 
victims who may be flown to another country for interrogation and 
torture.  He represents a collective interest in prohibiting abusive and 
illegal programs by executive officials.  There is a collective interest in 
assuring that constitutional values prevail over political and partisan 
shortcuts.388  Justice Hugo Black used to inveigh against artificial 
“balancing tests” that put an individual on one side of the scale and 
the government on the other.389  Often an individual speaks for the 
interests of society and the rule of law, and those interests must be 
protected against claims and assertions by government, especially 
claims of state secrets. 
V. CIA INTERROGATIONS 
After President Bush, in September 2006, confirmed the existence 
and operation of CIA prisons abroad and the transfer of fourteen 
suspects to Guantánamo, the Administration and Congress drafted 
legislation to comply with Hamdan.390  The White House and 
Republican Senators insisted on language that “would provide for 
continued tough interrogations of terrorism suspects by the CIA at 
secret detention sites.”391  The White House clearly intended to 
maintain two standards:  one for interrogations conducted by the 
Defense Department, subject to the rules set forth in the Army Field 
Manual, and a separate procedure for the CIA.  That distinction was 
openly discussed during debate on the military commissions bill.392
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan required military 
commissions to meet the standards contained in Common Article 3 
of the Geneva Conventions.393  It has that name because it appears in 
all four Geneva Conventions, prohibiting “violence to life and 
person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment 
and torture,” and “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, 
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humiliating and degrading treatment.”394  Section 6 of the Military 
Commissions Act, enacted in October 2006 in response to Hamdan, 
required President Bush to issue an executive order to implement 
treaty obligations, including Common Article 3.395  In signing the bill, 
President Bush said it would allow the CIA “to continue its program 
for questioning key terrorist leaders and operatives.”396  The 
legislation, according to Bush, provided “clarity our intelligence 
professionals need to continue questioning terrorists and saving lives.  
This bill provides legal protections that ensure our military and 
intelligence professionals will not have to fear lawsuits filed by 
terrorists simply for doing their jobs.”397
The Bush Administration did not seek “clarity.”  It sought statutory 
authority to protect CIA employees who engage in aggressive and 
abusive interrogations and who transfer suspects to locations where 
torture is likely.  As noted by Frederick Schwarz and Aziz Huq, clarity 
“was never the Administration’s goal.  After all, this was the 
Administration that for four years had used a standard of ‘humane 
treatment’ that lacked any definition whatsoever.  Rather than clarity, 
the Administration sought license to torture.”398  Whatever clarity the 
statute might provide, the procedures followed by CIA interrogators 
would remain secret.  It was widely believed—for good reason—that 
the methods would be prohibited by military interrogators.  
Otherwise, there would be no reason for the Administration to 
repeatedly insist on a different standard for the CIA.  Also, the 
provision for legal protections against lawsuits underscored that the 
CIA techniques would be aggressive, harsh, and of questionable 
legality.  Bush claimed that the bill “complies with both the spirit and 
the letter of our international obligations.”399  Unless the CIA 
methods were made public and neutral observers would be in the 
room during interrogations, the extent of compliance could never be 
known. 
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12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. 138. 
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In late July 2007, the White House agreed on procedures to allow 
the CIA to resume its interrogation of terrorism suspects overseas.400  
News reports indicated that the methods would allow techniques 
“more severe” than those used by military personnel.401  Several 
executive officials said that the techniques excluded 
“waterboarding.”402  The Justice Department concluded that the 
procedures did not violate the Geneva Conventions.403  Human rights 
groups objected that the authorization of “indefinite, 
incommunicado detention” and interrogation violated international 
law.404  Apparently, the International Committee of the Red Cross 
would be prohibited from visiting detainees held by the CIA.405  The 
only person at that time that the agency acknowledged holding was 
Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, an Iraqi Kurd said to be “one of Osama bin 
Laden’s closest advisers.”406  CIA officials said that he had “produced 
valuable intelligence” even though CIA interrogators, at that time, 
had followed the techniques approved in the Army Field Manual.407
The executive order issued by President Bush on July 20, 2007, 
interprets and applies Common Article 3 to the CIA.408  Prohibited 
interrogation practices include:  (1) torture (as defined by 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2340); (2) acts prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d) (including 
murder, torture, cruel or inhuman treatment, mutilation or 
maiming, intentionally causing bodily injury, rape, sexual assault or 
abuse, taking of hostages, or performing biological experiments); 
and (3) acts of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment prohibited by 
the Military Commissions Act and the Detainee Treatment Act.409  
Also prohibited:  (4) “willful and outrageous acts of personal abuse 
done for the purpose of humiliating or degrading the individual” 
(including “sexual or sexually indecent acts” and “forcing the 
individual to perform sexual acts or to pose sexually”); (5) 
“threatening the individual with sexual mutilation, or using the 
individual as a human shield;” and (6) “acts intended to denigrate the 
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instructions to the C.I.A. regarding the proper interrogation procedures under 
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religion, religious practices, or religious objects of the individual.”410  
“[D]etainees [are to] . . . receive the basic necessities of life, 
including adequate food and water, shelter from the elements, 
necessary clothing, protection from extremes of heat and cold, and 
essential medical care.”411
The words “done for the purpose of” and “intended to” seem a 
backdoor way to condone torture or violations of Geneva.  Nothing in 
Common Law 3 speaks of purpose or intent.  The prohibitions are 
not qualified.  The Bush Administration could argue that if the intent 
or purpose of CIA interrogation is to gather intelligence or prevent 
future terrorist attacks, CIA employees may commit outrageous acts 
to humiliate or degrade the individual or denigrate Islam.  If 
interpreted or administered in that manner, the executive order 
cannot be reconciled with Common Article 3.412
VI. CONCLUSION 
For most of U.S. history, presidents had no independent authority 
to transfer someone from the United States to a receiving country for 
trial.  They depended on extradition procedures set forth in treaties 
and statutes.  Renditions occurred under the Ker-Frisbie doctrine and 
other precedents for forcible abduction, but the purpose (as it was 
for extradition) was to bring someone to court for trial, not for 
interrogation and abuse. 
The Bush Administration and the United States paid a price, 
legally and politically, for sending suspects to other countries for 
interrogation and torture.  On numerous occasions the 
Administration decided to deceive the American public and the 
international community until studies conducted by the Council of 
Europe, independent analyses by private parties, and the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Hamdan forced it to admit what was widely known.  
An effective national security policy requires an administration to 
build trust with the public and to work jointly with Congress.  The 
policy of extraordinary rendition violates both needs. 
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